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School Choice: Income, Peer effect and the 
formation of Inequalities.  
 
 
Saïd HANCHANEa; Tarek MOSTAFAa*1 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium on the market for schooling where 
both public and private schools coexist and where individuals are differentiated by 
income and ability. We introduce a non linear in means model of peer effect by shedding 
the light on the fact that school quality is not solely dependent on mean ability but also on 
the dispersion of abilities. We study the distribution of students across sectors while 
examining the conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in the context 
of non single peaked preferences. Finally, we examine the presence of a hierarchy of 
school qualities. In the paper we shed the light on equity problems related to the access to 
educational quality while analyzing the functioning of the educational system. 
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Reducing inequalities both in the access to education and in the outcomes of education 
has become a major driving force of educational reforms in most developed countries. 
Unequal access to education, unequal outcomes, disparities of earnings, disparities of 
educational qualities between communities, and the quality of public education 
constituted an important subject of debate in the recent French presidential elections.  
Recent and ongoing international surveys by the OECD – PISA and IALS – showed that 
the outcomes of education in major western countries tend to have large levels of 
inequalities. For instance in PISA2000, Belgium, Germany, the USA, The UK and 
France turned out to be the most unequal states in term of the dispersion of students’ 
achievements over reading, numeracy and basic science tests1. The ongoing debate over 
these issues provides the motivation for our article as well as to the growing literature on 
school choice, college choice and urban economics. 
 
The aim of our paper is to study the formation of inequalities in the access to education 
and in educational outcomes through an analysis of stratification on the market for 
schooling when both private and public education alternatives coexist. We analyze 
stratification by contrasting individual behavior in term of voting over tax rates and 
private schools profit maximizing behavior. We shed the light on the fact that school 
quality and students’ achievements depend not only on mean ability in the school but also 
on the distribution of students thus on the dispersion of ability2. One reads for instance in 
a mimeo of Caroline Hoxby and Gretchen Weingarth (Hoxby, Weingarth, 2005 pp. 2 and 
30). 
“The linear-in-means model assumes that each student has the same effect on each other student (a 
homogeneous treatment effect). It also assumes that a single student whose achievement raises a class's 
mean achievement by two points has precisely the same effect as several students whose combined 
achievement raises the class's mean by two points (that is, all effects operate through one moment: the 
mean of peers)… Moreover, most applications of peer effects–school desegregation, school choice, college 
choice, urban economics–need to have non-linear peer effects to generate results that are interesting and 
that mimic the facts.” pp.30 “Our finding support for the Boutique and Focus models suggests that schools, 
colleges, and workplaces should be wary of creating peer groups in which some people are isolated. 
However, they should also avoid creating critical mass around a certain type of person. Some focus is 
good”. 
                                                 
1
 Chapter 5 in “Education, Equality and Social Cohesion” by Green, Preston and Janmatt provides 
interesting results on outcomes’ inequalities in five groups of countries: East Asia, the Nordic countries, the 
Germanic region, the Mediterranean countries and the predominantly English speaking countries.    
2
 In our model, we account for nonlinearity in mean ability by taking the variance of abilities into 
consideration. 
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The philosophy behind the introduction of peer ability dispersion in the quality function 
can be understood in two ways3. The first is related to the impact of the dispersion on 
students’ achievements. Schools with low ability dispersions tend to be more appreciated 
by students. When teaching, a teacher normally targets the mean ability students; students 
with ability higher than the mean understand more easily than those with mean ability 
and conversely for students with ability lower than the mean. In a highly dispersed class 
we have two groups, very high ability and very low ability students; when aiming at the 
mean ability holders, the high dispersion will negatively affect the transmission of 
knowledge since the teacher will no longer be able to cater to the needs of each group4. 
The second is understood through the signaling effect of education when information 
about an individual’s ability is incomplete5; belonging to a school with very high 
dispersion of ability reduces the quality of the signal that this individual generates, since 
outsiders with limited information on ability will no longer be able to identify his type. 
Thus, we can consider that school quality is decreasing in the variance of abilities. 
 
Our model constitutes an integrated analysis of school choice, stratification, and the 
provision of education by public and private sectors. It coincides and supports the 
empirical findings of Hoxby and Weingarth; in fact, since mean ability and the variance 
of abilities will be working in opposite directions, schools tend to have relatively 
homogenous student composition, in other terms students will not be isolated and a 
critical mass will not be built around a particular type. This was found by Hoxby and 
Weingarth to be an efficient form of mixing. 
 
The analysis of public versus private school choice started with Yoram Barzel (1973); in 
a critical study of an article of Robin Barlow (1970) he introduced what is known as the 
“Ends against the middle phenomenon” for which we have a coalition of the rich and the 
poor against the middle class. The study of Barzel constituted an introduction to a more 
                                                 
3
 M Dertouzos et al (1989; pp. 84-85) underlined the need to take the dispersion in test scores into account. 
R. Benabou (1996) explored the effect of human capital dispersion on economic growth.   
4
 This is consistent with the Boutique and the Focus models. See Hoxby and Weingarth 2005, pp 6.    
5
 A school known to be highly selective can be imagined to have a high mean ability and a low ability 
variance, since selection leads to the homogenization of the student population.  
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formalized theoretical approach of school choice, starting with Joseph Stiglitz in (1974), 
Clotfelter (1976) and Sonstelie (1979). 
 
Stiglitz analyzed the demand for schooling under different institutional arrangements. In 
his study education is a complex good; it is consumption and an investment good as well 
as a screening instrument. He notes that preferences are not single peaked when public 
and private alternatives coexist. All these characteristics may prevent the existence of a 
majority voting equilibrium. At this level, two categories of articles are relevant to our 
analysis. 
 
The first concerns the article written by Fernandez and Rogerson 1996 on the provision 
of public goods in a multicommunity model, the one written by Epple and Romano1996, 
and the one written by Glomm and Ravikumar. The latter constructed a majority voting 
equilibrium determined by the individual with median income in the context of non 
single peaked preferences; they provided the necessary conditions for the existence of 
this equilibrium. In their article individuals are differentiated only by income, and quality 
is only dependent on public expenditure per pupil. The objective of these articles was the 
study of the provision of public services. 
  
The second concerns the series of articles written by Epple et al (1998, and 2006), two 
major characteristics are the linearity in mean ability and the single crossing assumption. 
In 1998, Epple and Romano considered an economy where individuals are differentiated 
by income and ability; the private sector is active and private schools maximize their 
profit, this strategic behavior combined to a single crossing assumption leads to the 
existence of a hierarchy of school qualities. In their article quality is only dependent on 
peer group effects. In 2006 the authors added an income diversity measure in order to 
estimate a model for higher education. The objective of these articles was the analysis of 
stratification between schools. Some related literature may include Calabrese et al (2006), 
Epple and Platt (1998), Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984-1993). 
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In this paper, we carry on the work made by Glomm, Ravikumar (1998), Epple and 
Romano (1998), by combining the study of stratification and the provision of public 
services when private alternatives exist. Our model differs in a number of ways, in 
comparison to the study of Glomm and Ravikumar; we consider an economy where 
individuals are differentiated by both income and ability. We present the necessary 
conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in the context of non single 
peaked preferences. We analyze the distribution of students across sectors and schools, 
while presenting two equity related problems. First, private schools will operate to the 
detriment of public schools by siphoning high ability high income students. Second, 
inequalities of educational opportunity exist when a fraction of the population does not 
have an equal access to educational achievement, given its allocation of income and 
ability. 
 
In our model, similarly to Epple and Romano, the private sector is active. Private schools 
maximize profits under a quality constraint. Unlike them, we consider a school quality 
that is dependent on peer effect and the dispersion of peer ability in a school and we do 
not impose a single crossing assumption. Individual utility will be maximized through a 
utility taking assumption. Peer group effect and the dispersion of peer ability are built 
into our model; these factors are the corner stone of the discriminating pricing strategy. 
The inclusion of peer group effect and the dispersion effect is consistent with the 
literature on this subject; Summers and Wolfe (1977), Henderson (1978), Sorensen and 
Hallinan (1986), Kulik (1992), Benabou (1996) and Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) have 
provided evidence that such an effect exists.  
 
Our equilibrium will be characterized by the existence of an indifference point between 
the two sectors determined by a couple of income and ability. The distribution of students 
across sectors and schools, given the discriminating pricing strategy will happen to the 
detriment of public schools. Individuals with high ability and income levels will be in the 
private sector; individuals with high ability and low income levels will be in the private 
sector and will receive financial aides; individuals with high income and low ability 
levels will be in the private sector and will pay tuition premia; individuals with low 
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ability and income levels will be in the public sector. Individual behavior and preferences 
will determine the existence conditions of a majority voting equilibrium over tax rates. 
 
Section I presents the model, equilibrium conditions follow in section II, section III 
examines the distribution of students across sectors, the conditions for a majority voting 
equilibrium and the existence of a hierarchy of school qualities, section IV concludes. An 
appendix contains mathematical details. 
 
I- The model 
 
In our model, we consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents; the number 
of types is largely superior to that of schools, we do not make a difference between 
households and students, each household has one student and decisions are made by the 
household. Students have identical preferences over consumption; they are differentiated 
by their income and ability levels, an individual i (with i = 1, 2, 3, 4, …, P) has an 
income iy  and an ability ib , i is also used to denote a type of individuals. Income and 
ability are distributed in the population according to ),( ybf which is positive, and 
continuous on its support ),0(),0( maxmax ybS ×≡ . 
 
Individual utility is assumed to be a function of consumption goods other than education 
and school quality. It is denoted ),( qcU , U is continuous, twice differentiable, and 
increasing in both arguments. Education is considered to be a superior 
good 0),(lim =
∞→
qcU
c
, in other terms individuals always choose the highest school quality 
they can afford given their disposable income. 
 
School quality is determined by school expenditure per pupil E, by peer group effect jθ , 
and by the dispersion of peer ability in a school 2jσ . Quality is increasing in the first two 
arguments and decreasing in the last. j is an index denoting a particular school, (with j = 
1, 2, 3, …, j). Educational achievement is given by ),( qbaa = ; a is continuous and 
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increasing function of both arguments. Thus, the access to a higher quality school is 
translated through higher achievements. In term of inequalities, unequal access to 
education generates unequal outcomes.   
 
Education production cost depends only on the number of students enrolled in a 
particular school, it is denoted C (k) = V (k) + F with 0>′V  and 0<′′V or 0>′′V 6. 
k is the number of students in this school; F is a constant reflecting a fixed cost when no 
student are enrolled. The existence of economies of scale in the production of educational 
services is realistic; it will prevent the existence of an infinite number of private schools. 
In our model we suppose that the number of student types is largely superior to the 
number of schools. 
 
Each private school will retain a fraction of the student population that has chosen the 
private sector, by applying tuition and admission policy permitting the maximization of 
each individual’s utility through a utility taking assumption. The pricing strategies will be 
characterized by a meritocratic system. 
 
In the private sector, students with ability higher than the mean receive a tuition 
reduction, conversely, students with ability lower than the mean pay a tuition premia. 
Similarly, students with ability close to the mean or (an ability pushing the variance 
downward receives tuition reductions, conversely, students with ability far from the mean 
(an ability pushing the mean upward) pay tuition premia. This discriminating pricing 
strategy is justified in the context of internalizing the externality generated by the 
position of a student’s ability in the distribution of abilities in the school. 
 
It is important to note that there will be no supplementary educational investments in 
students with low ability levels, as a consequence school expenditure per student will be 
the same for all students in a particular school. 
 
                                                 
6
 The existence or nonexistence of economies of scale in the production of education is discussed in the 
optimization section. 
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Individuals in the private sector can always choose public sector schools, conversely 
individuals obliged to enroll in the public sector given their allocation of income and 
ability do not have the opportunity to enroll in private schools. 
 
The public Sector:  
 
 Public schools are income tax financed; all individuals pay taxes dedicated to 
financing public education even if they do not use public schools. Public sector resources 
are determined by tY  ; and the expenditure per student is determined by
N
tY
. Public sector 
schools do not receive tuition, thus 0=ijup . 
With,   t: The tax rate determined through majority voting. 
 Y: Total income. 
 N: The number of students in the public sector. ],0[ PN ∈ . 
P: The number of students in the economy. 
u is an index denoting a particular public school. 
 
The quality of education in the public sector for a school j is written as follows:  




=
2
,, jujuju N
tYq σθ  
N
tY is homogenous for all schools and students. However peer group effect and dispersion 
effect may be different or homogenous depending on whether public schools have 
strategical selection procedures7. 
  
We denote ),( ybjuα as the conditional distribution, it represents the number of students 
of type ),( yb  enrolled in a particular public school. 
∫∫=
s
juju dbdyybfybk ),(),(α is the global distribution; with∑ = Nk ju . 
                                                 
7
 The analysis of public schools’ strategical behavior will be seen in the last section. 
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Individual utility in the public sector is of the following form: 
]),1([ juiiu qtyUU −=  
Indirect utility can be written as: 
( )ijujuiiuiu bNYytWWU ,,,,,, 2σθ==  
 
In the public sector, utility maximization is trivial. A student will allocate his disposable 
income (after the deduction of taxes dedicated to public school finance) to private 
consumption. 
 
 The private sector: 
 
In the private sector, schools are tuition financed. Parents pay a positive tuition equal 
to ijrp . Private school resources can be determined by∑ ijrp . These resources are not 
entirely distributed over students; per student expenditure is determined by dividing the 
production cost of education by the number of students in the school. The difference 
between resources and expenditure represent private school’s profit. This positive profit 
will encourage new schools to enter the market until it vanishes (in a competitive 
market). 
Expenditure per student is given by: 
jr
jr
jr
jr
k
FkV
k
kC +
=
)()(
 
r is an index denoting a particular private school. 
 
We denote ),( ybjrα as the conditional distribution, it represents the number of students 
of type ),( yb  enrolled in a particular private school. 
∫∫=
s
jrjr dbdyybfybk ),(),(α is the global distribution; with∑ −= NPk jr . 
The quality of education in the private sector for a school j is written as follows:  








=
2
,,
)(
jrjr
jr
jr
jr k
kC
qq σθ  
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It should be noted that private school quality is positively correlated with individual 
income; when income increases, the private quality that can be purchased is much higher. 
When an individual compares quality in both sectors; his ability level has no influence 
because it is the same in all schools. 
 
Private sector quality is heterogeneous between schools in all arguments.  Private school 
expenditure is homogenous for students attending the same school, and heterogeneous 
between schools. Peer group effect and dispersion effect are heterogeneous between 
schools. 
 
Individual utility in the private sector is of the following form: 
],)1([ jrijriir qptyUU −−=  
Individuals are going to choose an optimal combination between consumption goods and 
school quality in order to maximize their utility. 
Max ],)1([ jrijriir qptyUU −−=  
Subject to ( ) iiijr ctyp −−= 1   with c as consumption. 
 Indirect utility can be written as: ( )ijrjriirir bytWWU ,,,, 2* σθ== , it represents the only 
solution to this optimization. 
 
Private schools behave strategically on the market; they maximize profits as utility takers 
by conditioning admission and tuition according to ability levels. The utility obtained in a 
school should be at least equal to that obtained elsewhere. This behavior is similar to that 
of private clubs with non anonymous crowding, see Scotchmer and wooders (1987). It 
should be noted that individual ability is perfectly observable by private schools. 
 
Private schools have to maximize the following function: 
[ ] FkVdbdyybfybybpMax j
s
jrijrjr −−= ∫∫ )(),(),(),( αpi     (1) 
Subject to:  
( ) [ ]NPybjr −∈ ,0,α  ( )yb,∀        (1a) 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]jrijrijrijrir qybptyMaxUqybptyUU ),,(1),,(1 −−≥−−=  ( )yb,∀  (1b) 
∫∫=
s
jrjr dbdyybfybk ),(),(α         (1c) 
∫∫=
s
jr
jr
jr dbdyybfybbk ),(),(
1
αθ        (1d) 
( ) dbdyybfybb
k jr
s
jr
jr
jr ),(),(
1 22 αθσ ∫∫ −=       (1e) 
Constraint (1c) determines the umber of students enrolled in a particular private school. 
Constraint (1d) determines peer group effect given by mean ability. Constraint (1e) 
determines dispersion effect given by the variance of peer ability. Constraint (1b) 
represents the utility taking assumption.   
 
II- Equilibrium conditions 
 
Three types of conditions are necessary for the existence of equilibrium: 
 
A- The conditions for private sector equilibrium are: 
• Individual utility maximization: 
[ ]jrijri qptyMaxUybU ,)1(),(* −−=  
• Private schools’ profits maximization: 
)],(),,(,,,[ 2 ybybpk jrijrjrjrjr ασθ    Satisfies equation (1). 
• New entries are expected so long as private schools expect to make a profit; the 
private sector equilibrium will be defined by. 
0=jrpi  j=1, 2, 3, 4, …, n. new entries are no longer profitable. 
 
B- The conditions for public sector equilibrium are: 
• Public schools are not tuition financed: 
0),( =ybpiju  
• ( ) [ ]Nybju ,0, ∈α   ( )yb,∀  
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• The number of students in a public school is given by: 
∫∫=
s
juju dbdyybfybk ),(),(α  
• Public school’s mean ability is given by : 
∫∫=
s
ju
ju
ju dbdyybfybbk ),(),(
1
αθ  
• Public school peer ability variance is given by: 
( ) dbdyybfybb
k ju
s
ju
ju
ju ),(),(
1 22 αθσ ∫∫ −=  
C- All students in the age for schooling are enrolled in one of the two sectors: 
∑ ∑ =−+=+ PNPNkk jrju )(   ( )yb,∀  
This condition represents market clearance; public schools are preferred to no schooling. 
 
III- Theoretical results: 
 
A- Private schools’ profit maximization results. 
The optimal function combining tuition and individual utility is given by: 
),,,(),(*],)1([ * ijriirjrijriir bytWybUqptyU θ==−−   ( )yb,∀  (2) 
The optimal level of tuition is: 
[ ]Nybju ,0),( ∈α          (3) 
[ ]NPybjr −∈ ,0),(α       
])[()()( 22* jrjrjrjrjrjrijr bbkVp σθµθµ −−′+−+′=         ( )yb,∀    
With jrµ and jrµ ′ are the Lagrangian multipliers8. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Result (3) are obtained by forming a Lagrangian function to take account of constraints (1c) and (1d) and 
(1e), then by optimizing over jrα . Mathematical details are to be found in the appendix.  
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This price is what an individual of type (b,y) should be able to pay in order to be admitted 
in school j. This price is formed of two parts; fraction )( jrkV ′ represents a homogenous 
price for all students resulting from the production cost of education, fraction 
)( ijrjr b−θµ represents the price resulting from the difference between own ability and 
mean ability, and fraction ])[( 22 jrjrjr b σθµ −−′  represents the price resulting from the 
positioning of an individual’s ability around the mean. Students with ability levels lower 
than school mean ability jrib θ<  will have to pay a tuition premia equal 
to 0)( >− ijrjr bθµ . Students with ability levels higher than school mean ability jrib θ>  
will receive tuition discount equal to 0)( <− ijrjr bθµ . Conversely, students with 
22)( jrjrb σθ >−  will pay a tuition premia equal to 0])[( 22 >−−′ jrjrjr b σθµ ; students with 
22)( jrjrb σθ <− will receive a tuition reduction equal to 0])[( 22 <−−′ jrjrjr b σθµ . It 
should be said that the distance of one’s ability from the mean determines the importance 
of 2)( jrb θ− relatively to 2jrσ ; students with ability equal to the mean receive maximum 
reduction equal to ][ 2jrjr σµ ′ and as we go away from the mean this price reduction 
decreases until it becomes a positive price9. An example of the distribution of 
externalities in a school is given in figure 2. 
                                                 
9
 Note that 2)( jrb θ− is always positive and has the effect of increasing price. 
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An interesting result is related to the difference between peer group effect and the 
dispersion effect; peer effect has these two properties 
)()(lim max
max
bb jrjrjrjrbb −=−→ θµθµ and θµθµ jrjrjrb b =−→ )(lim0 ; while dispersion effect 
has these two properties ])[(])[(lim 22max22
max
jrjrjrjrjrjrbb
bb σθµσθµ −−′=−−′
→
and 
222 ])[(lim jrjrjrjrjrb b σµσθµθ ′−=−−′→ . In other words, for a student the benefit of having 
ability largely higher than the mean is high in term of peer effect and the cost is also high 
in term of dispersion effect; similarly, the cost of peer effect attains its 
maximum θµ jr at 0=b and the benefit of dispersion effect attains its maximum 
2
jrjrσµ ′− at jrb θ= . 
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In our pricing function, schools admit all students who are able to pay a price *ijrpp ≥ , 
however no student would accept to pay a price superior to the Pareto optimal one *ijrp  
unless there is no school that cater to his needs. The existence of economies of scale in 
the production of education ( ) 0<′′ jkV  limits the number of schools and thus some 
students will be obliged to find a second best solution. Otherwise, ( ) 0>′′ jkV  the market 
produces a large number of schools catering to each type. For the rest of the paper we 
consider ( ) 0>′′ jkV to be true10.  
 
It is of a great importance to note that the price of private education can be negative. For 
some students we may have 0)( <− bjrjr θµ , 
0])[( 22 <−−′ jrjrjr b σθµ and ])[()()( 22* jrjrjrjrjrjrijr bbkVp σθµθµ −−′+−+′= <0. This 
negative price represents a financial aid to students permitting an important amelioration 
of school quality. This pricing strategy represents the corner stone of our meritocratic 
system.  
 
Our results converge towards the empirical findings of Hoxby and Weingarth 2005; 
schools looking for a quality peer effect tend to have a high mean ability and a low 
variance. However since mean ability and the variance of abilities operate in opposite 
directions, schools have to make a compromise between the two effects, this leads to a 
relative homogenization of the students’ population without creating a critical mass 
around one type. These results are consistent with the Boutique and the focus models and 
diverge considerably from the linear in means models11. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Lawrence Kenny 1982 provided some evidence that economies of scale do exist in the production of 
education. A counterargument was provided by Ferris and West 2004; it relies on the existence of external 
costs that increase with size and can be related to social problems present in large schools. 
11
 Note that in the work of Epple and Romano 1982, subsidization between low ability high income 
students and high ability low income students is pushed to the limits. In our model schools can no longer 
admit students with abilities so far from the mean since the variance has a negative effect on pricing and 
quality.  
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B- Majority voting results. 
 
Proofs of propositions and lemmas are to be found in the appendix. 
 
Notation remark: If ( )yb ′′, is better than ( )yb ˆ,ˆ . It is denoted ( )yb ′′, > ( )yb ˆ,ˆ .  This means that bb ˆ>′  
and yy ˆ>′ , or bb ˆ>′  and yy ˆ=′ , or bb ˆ=′  and yy ˆ>′ , orb′ is weakly inferior to bˆ  while y′ is largely 
superior to yˆ , or finally b′ is largely superior to bˆ  while y′ is weakly inferior to yˆ . With ( )yb ′′, and 
( )yb ˆ,ˆ  two couples of ability and income. For the last two cases the superiority of one of the couples 
depends on the structural form of the utility function.  
 
Proposition 1: we suppose that 0),(lim =
∞→
qcU
c
 0>∀q . 
Given [ ]1,0∈t  , ( )PN ,0∈  and +ℜ∈Y . There exists a unique couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  with 0ˆ >b  
and 0ˆ >y  such that ( )ijujuiiu bNYytWW ,,,,,, 2σθ=  ≥  ( )ijrjriir bytWW ,,,, 2σθ=  if and 
only if yyi ˆ< and bbi ˆ< . 
 
In this proposition, we ignore extreme cases. For t=0, we have N=0, nobody will choose 
the public sector. Conversely for t=1, we have N=P, everybody will choose the pubic 
sector. An important remark to take into account is that the positioning of ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  will 
depend on income and ability distribution and the quality of education in the public sector 
determined by t Y and N. 
Lemma 1: as in proposition 1 we suppose that 0),(lim =
∞→
qcU
c
 0>∀q . 
Given [ ]1,0∈t  , ( )PN ,0∈  and +ℜ∈Y . (i) Individuals with yyi ˆ< and bbi ˆ< will be 
enrolled in the public sector. (ii) Individuals with yyi ˆ>  and bbi ˆ> will be enrolled in the 
private sector. (iii) Individual with yyi ˆ<  and bbi ˆ>  will be enrolled in the private 
sector and will receive tuition discounts. (iiii) Individuals with yyi ˆ>  and bbi ˆ< will be 
enrolled in the private sector and will pay tuition premia. (iii) and (iii) depend on certain 
conditions.   
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(i) And (ii) represent the outcome of proposition 1. The proof of (iii) and (iiii) depends on 
the fact that the disposable income should cover the price of private education when it is 
positive; secondly on the fact that 0),(lim =
∞→
qcU
c
. When consumption becomes largely 
superior to school quality (when most of individual income is dedicated to consumption), 
individual utility tends to decrease. In other words, Individuals accept a decrease in 
consumption if school quality increases; they will choose the highest level of quality 
given their disposable income. 
 
In this lemma we show that given our discriminating private pricing function, 
compensation between ability and income is possible. Sufficiently high abilities allow a 
student to compensate his lack of income by having a tuition reduction or a scholarship. 
Conversely, sufficiently high levels of income allow a student to compensate his lack of 
ability by giving him a higher purchasing power in order to buy private school quality. 
We can see that compensation will allow private schools to operate to the detriment of 
public schools by siphoning high ability high income students. Two uncommon cases 
shall be mentioned: individuals with abilities weakly higher than bˆ and very low income 
levels, and individuals with incomes weakly higher than yˆ and very low ability levels will 
not be admitted in the private sector since b and y are not sufficient to compensate the 
lack on income and ability respectively. 
 
Lemma 2: in this lemma we establish the properties of the couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  relatively to N, Y 
and t. (i) For ( )PN ,0∈ , the couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is decreasing in N. (ii) For +ℜ∈Y , the couple 
( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is increasing in Y. (iii) For [ ]1,0∈t , the couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is increasing in t. 
Proofs for (i) and (ii) are based on the fact that private school quality is not related 
to N and Y. These factors only influence school choice through public school quality. 
Proof for (iii) is based on the fact that t has the same influence on consumption in both 
sectors. t also has an effect on public school quality without affecting that of private 
schools. 
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When we say ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  increases, this means that both bˆ and yˆ increase, or one of them 
increases while he other remains the same, or one of them largely increases while the 
other weakly decreases. The reverse is true when we say ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  decreases. 
 
Proposition 2: for [ ]1,0∈t  and +ℜ∈Y . There exists a unique N* which determines the 
number of students in the public sector as a result of majority voting. The number of 
individuals with yyi ˆ< and bbi ˆ< must be exactly equal to N*.  
 
So far we have considered an exogenous tax rate; in the following sections we 
endogenize the tax rate through majority voting. For an individual i, the most preferred 
tax rate is denoted as: 
)]},,,,(),,,,,,,(max{max[),( 22* ijrjriirijujuiiuii bytWbNYytWArgybt σθσθ=  
This tax rate will maximize individual utility in the sector offering the highest indirect 
utility. 
 
We denote ),( iiiu ybt the tax rate that maximizes utility in the public sector for an 
individual i with a couple ),( ii yb . ),,,,,(maxarg),( ijuiiuiiiu bNYytWybt θ= . 
 
We denote ),(ˆ iii ybt the tax rate for which an individual is indifferent between the two 
sectors. In this case ),,,ˆ(),,,,,ˆ( ijriirijuiiu bytWbNYytW θθ = . It is clear that for each 
couple of ability and income, there exists a critical tax rate which determines the state of 
indifference. For low levels of t, the private sector is preferred; for high level of t, the 
public sector is preferred. While passing from an extreme to the other, there exists a 
tipping point of preferences determined by the tax rate ),(ˆ iii ybt . 
 
Joseph Stiglitz (1974) has presented the fact that, preferences over tax rates are not single 
peaked. For low tax rates, public school quality is low and individuals prefer private 
schools. A marginal increase of the tax rate will not increase public school quality that 
much, but will reduce consumption; private schools will still be preferred and utility will 
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be reduced. An important increase of the tax rate will induce an important increase of 
public school quality; at ),(ˆ iii ybt individuals will be indifferent between the two sectors; 
from this point on, an increase in the tax rate will reverse tendencies and the public sector 
becomes preferable, utility is increasing in t. When the tax rate reaches ),( iiiu ybt utility is 
maximal in the public sector; from this point on utility is decreasing in t. Thus we find 
that utilities may have two peaks, one in each sector. This is represented in figure 1. 
 
For extreme cases where individuals have low ability and income levels; they can not 
choose private schools and thus they are obliged to enroll in public ones; they have single 
peaked preferences. Conversely, individuals with very high income and ability levels will 
choose private schools (See Lemma 1); they have single peaked preferences. Households 
with old or no children can be regarded as individuals with high ability and income 
levels; they have single peaked preferences and always vote for a zero tax rate, this can 
be seen on the preference curve A.   
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Assumption 1: students with higher abilities can get higher educational qualities. 
This assumption is intuitive, even if in the same school a higher ability may have 
contradicting effects, because mean ability is higher and dispersion is higher too. 
Since ( ) 0>′′ jkV , the market produces a large number of schools catering to each type. 
High ability students will always be able to find a higher quality school willing to enroll 
them given their endowments in ability and income and the discriminating pricing 
function.   
 
Assumption 2: students with higher income levels can get higher educational qualities. 
This assumption is simple to understand, higher income students have higher purchasing 
power. They can afford higher levels of education in the private sector. 
 
For the same level of income; when b increases, the quality that can be obtained 
increases. In the public sector the quality that can be obtained increases with b until 
reaching its maximum in the school with the highest public quality12. From this point on 
any increase in ability provokes a tipping point, students will opt out of public schools 
and will join the private sector. If for a sufficiently high ability, a student stays in the 
public sector; he will have his utility reduced. We can write: 
0),,,,,,(lim 2 =
+∞→
ijujuiiub
bNYytW σθ and +∞=
+∞→
),,,,(lim 2 ijujuiirb bytW σθ  
 
For the same level of ability; when y increases, the quality that can be purchased 
increases. In the public sector, since education is free, an income increase permits only a 
higher consumption and thus a higher utility. Since 0),(lim =
∞→
qcU
c
, when income 
becomes sufficiently large, students opt out of the public sector and join the private one. 
If for sufficiently high income, a student stays in the public sector; he will have a high 
consumption and a low school quality, and thus he will have his utility 
reduced. 0),,,,,,(lim 2 =
+∞→
ijujuiiuy
bNYytW σθ and +∞=
+∞→
),,,,(lim 2 ijujuiirb bytW σθ  
 
                                                 
12
 The fact that public schools may have different quality levels will be discussed in the last section. 
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By combining these previous explanations we can write: 
0),,,,,,(lim 2
),(
=
+∞→
ijujuiiuyb
bNYytW σθ  
+∞=
+∞→
),,,,(lim 2
),( ijujuiiryb
bytW σθ  
When the couple (b,y) becomes sufficiently high, staying in the public sector becomes 
costly. 
For two individuals with ),(),( 2211 ybyb > we can write: 
If )ˆ,ˆ(),(),( 2211 ybybyb >> both individuals are in the private sector; with: 
),,,,,,(),,,,,,( 22221211 bNYytWbNYytW jujuujujuu σθσθ <  
),,,,(),,,,( 22221211 bytWbytW jrjrrjrjrr σθσθ >  
 
Lemma 3: The indifference tax rate ),(ˆ iii ybt is increasing in the couple ),( ii yb over the 
interval ( bˆ , maxb ) x ( yˆ , maxy ). This can be explained intuitively; higher income and 
ability individuals have higher indifference tax rate since they demand higher public 
educational quality. 
 
In this part of our analyses we study the existence of a majority voting equilibrium 
determined by the individual with the mean couple of income and ability that we 
denote ),( mm yb . We establish the necessary conditions for this existence. 
 
We denote ),( mmmu ybt  the tax rate which maximizes the utility of this individual; 
),(ˆ mmm ybt the tax rate for which the individual is indifferent between public and private 
sectors. We denote mN the number of students in the public sector under ),( mmmu ybt . 
   
The individual with the median couple of income and ability separates the population into 
two fractions of 50%. In order to demonstrate that a majority voting equilibrium exists 
and is determined by this individual; we have to demonstrate that there does not exist a 
tax rate that is preferred to ),( mmmu ybt  by more than 50% of the population. It is clear 
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that for the individual with the median couple of income and ability; ),( mmmu ybt is 
preferred. Thus, it will be sufficient to demonstrate that the fraction of the population 
with ),( yb > ),( mm yb or ),( yb < ),( mm yb prefer the tax rate ),( mmmu ybt to prove the 
existence of a majority voting equilibrium determined by the median individual. 
 
Two conditions are necessary for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium 
determined by the individual with the median couple of income and ability: 
Condition 1: ),( iiiu ybt is decreasing in the couple ),( ii yb . For two individuals having 
),( 22 yb > ),( 11 yb we have ),( 111 ybt u > ),( 222 ybt u . 
Condition 2: ],,,,,),,([],,,,0[ 22 mjujummmmmumumjrjrmmr bNYyybtWbyW σθσθ < , this 
means that the individual with the median couple of income and ability prefer public 
education financed at a positive tax rate ),( mmmu ybt to private education when the public 
sector does not exist.  
 
Given individual behavior shown in figure 1; we are going to study the existence of 
majority voting equilibrium over 3 intervals: )],(ˆ,0[ mmm ybt , )],(),,(ˆ[ mmmummm ybtybt  
et ]1),,([ mmmu ybt . 
 
Lemma 4: over the interval ]1),,([ mmmu ybt , there does not exist a tax rate which is 
preferred to ),( mmmu ybt by more than 50% of the population. 
 
Lemma 5: over the interval )],(),,(ˆ[ mmmummm ybtybt , there does not exist a tax rate which 
is preferred to ),( mmmu ybt by more than 50% of the population. 
An important property used in the proofs of lemma 4 and 5 is based on the fact that 
public sector utility is increasing over the interval )],(),,(ˆ[ iiiuiii ybtybt and decreasing 
over the interval ]1),,([ iiiu ybt in the tax rate. 
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Lemma 6:  
(i) If ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmumu bNYyybtW σθ  
Then ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmuu σθ  For ),( 11 yb < ),( mm yb . 
(ii) If ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmumu bNYyybtW σθ  
Then ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmuu σθ  For ),( 11 yb > ),( mm yb . 
Lemma 6 means that if the individual with the mean couple of income and ability prefers 
(does not prefer) the positive tax rate ),( mmmu ybt over zero; the fraction of the population 
having an inferior (a superior) couple of income and ability has the same behavior as him. 
 
Proposition 3: if ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmumu bNYyybtW σθ is true, 
then the couple ),( mm Nt is a majority voting equilibrium.  
Conversely, if ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmumu bNYyybtW σθ is true. All 
individuals with a couple of income and ability higher than ),( mm yb  prefer a zero tax rate 
because ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmuu σθ . The majority 
voting equilibrium is determined by the couple )0,0( . 
 
If the first equilibrium condition is not satisfied, then a majority voting equilibrium may 
not exist. If the second condition is not satisfied then )0,0( is a majority voting 
equilibrium. 
 
C- The existence of a hierarchy of school quality. 
 
In their analyses, Epple and Romano (1998) have demonstrated the existence of a 
hierarchy of school quality in the private sector. They have argued that if two schools 
have the same level of quality, they can increase their profit by modifying the student 
composition of the school by exchanging the same number of different ability and 
income students. Quality will increase for one and decrease for the other. This strategy 
will allow a profit increase following a differentiation of quality. The single crossing 
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condition is central to the demonstration; it implies that higher ability higher income 
students value increased quality by more than lower ability lower income types.  
 
Two major differences exist in our model relatively to Epple and Romano.  
 
The first difference is related to the fact that school quality in our model is dependent on 
expenditure per pupil, mean ability and the dispersion of abilities. Expenditure per pupil 
is not an additional variable relatively to Epple and Romano since it is determined 
by
jr
jr
jr
jr
k
FkV
k
kC +
=
)()(
, exchanging the same number of students would not have an 
effect on expenditure. However the inclusion of the dispersion of abilities has an 
important effect, it is no longer sufficient to exchange ),( 11 yb types for ),( 22 yb when 
12 bb > and 12 yy > . Admitting higher ability students has contradicting effects on quality, 
it increases quality through peer effect and it reduces quality through the dispersion of 
abilities. The final effect of this exchange depends on the structural form of educational 
quality. The second difference is that in our model we did not impose a single crossing 
assumption. 
These two differences may result in the absence of a strict hierarchy of private school 
qualities. Different schools may have the same quality through different combinations 
of 2,
)(
jrjr
jr
jr
and
k
kC
σθ . Two private schools with the same quality will charge the same 
price13. 
 
School hierarchy in the public sector: 
 
Following the equilibrium between the two sectors, the number of students enrolled in the 
public sector is given by N. Since public schools are free entry free of tuition schools, the 
income level of individuals will not have an effect on their distribution between 
                                                 
13
 See Epple and Romano 1998, pp. 56. 
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schools14. We have previously seen that expenditure per student is the same for all public 
schools and depend on income tax levels, thus public school quality can only be 
differentiated through peer effect or dispersion effect. 
 
In the public system, the absence of restrictions on entry encourages individuals to 
choose the school (or the number of schools) with maximum quality levels, denoted 
juqmax . If all N individuals have the same behavior, they will all end up in the school 
with juqmax , and then uju qq =max  with uq the level of quality when the N individuals 
are enrolled in the single existing public school u15. 
 
Following this kind of equilibrium, a suboptimal solution is reached. Individuals 
providing a non-internalized positive externality are disadvantaged and individuals 
providing non internalized negative externalities are advantaged. In this situation, a 
hierarchy of qualities will not exist in the public sector, and public school quality is given 
by uq . 
In what follows, we identify two different solutions for the problem. 
 
a- Screening by examination: this is a trivial solution, if public schools are allowed 
to screen individuals according to their ability; we will have a number of schools 
that is at least equal to the number of types ib in the population. If a school defines 
an access score by jus that is measured by ability units, it will accept all students 
with jui sb ≥ . An individual looking for a high level of educational quality will 
choose a school with iju bs ≥ in order to be enrolled with students with at least the 
same ability level. The combination of iju bs ≥ and jui sb ≥ leads to the optimal 
equilibrium condition iju bs = . Thus a hierarchy of qualities will exist and it 
follows the distribution of ability types in the population. It should be noted that a 
                                                 
14
 In this paper, residential choice is not built into the model. In a multicommunity model, income will have 
an effect on the distribution of students between public schools through residential choice.   
15
 This public school can operate on multiple geographical locations (multiple campuses), but it can be 
regarded as a large single public school since expenditure per pupil, peer effect and dispersion effects 
would be the same.  
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number of different schools can share a group of students of the same type; in this 
case, these schools will have the same quality and the hierarchy will not be strict. 
 
b- Compensation schemes: another optimality improving solution to the problem 
can be obtained through a compensation scheme; in this context public schools 
have to maximize a resources function. Similarly to private schools’ profit 
maximization, resources maximization yields the marginal cost function of 
admitting a student in a public school. It is of the following form: 
( ) ])[()(),,( 22 jujujujujujujuii bbkVybmc σθµθµθ −−′+−+′= . Since public 
schools are free of tuition, the resources collected through income taxes should 
cover the total cost of students in the public sector. In this case the funding 
condition is [ ]∑∑ −−′+−+′= ])[()()( 22 jujujujujuju bbkVE σθµθµ ; expenditure 
per pupil should be able to compensate positive externality providers through 
financial aids, and should counterbalance the negative impact of negative 
externality providers, since they would not pay (free public schools) in order to 
internalize their negative externality. This solution does not lead to the creation of 
a quality hierarchy; instead, we still have the same large public school with uq . It 
is not fully optimal, since negative externality providers do not pay to compensate 
their negative impact on quality. The optimal solution would be like the one in 
private schools, negative externality providers compensate directly positive 
externality providers, tax revenues should only cover the part related to the 
functioning of public schools )( jukV ′ . This may seem unacceptable since 
optimality contradicts the free entrance assumption to public schools; public 
schools will become private to a certain degree. It should be noted that a 
combination of screening by examination and compensation schemes can lead to 
the existence of a non-strict hierarchy of school quality with each school 
regrouping at least two different types of individuals. It should be noted that the 
equilibrium point between public and private sectors will be modified since public 
schools behave strategically through selection or resources maximization; this 
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entails a study of competition on the market of schooling which is not the object 
of this paper. 
 
 
IV- Conclusion 
  
In this paper, we have constructed an equilibrium on the market for education where 
individuals are differentiated by income and ability and where educational quality is not 
linear in mean ability. We have studied the distribution of students across sectors while 
mentioning the fact that private schools will operate to the detriment of public sector 
schools by siphoning high income high ability students. We have presented the necessary 
conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium determined by the individual 
with the median couple of income and ability. Finally, we have analyzed the presence of 
a hierarchy of quality in both sectors.  
 
According to our results, stratification by income and ability will prevent a fraction of the 
student population from having access to a more performing education, given its 
allocation of income and ability. In future studies, we may want to revisit models of 
urban economics contrasting school choice with residential choice in order to get a more 
generalized view of the provision of educational services, stratification, and the formation 
of inequalities in the access to education. 
 
Appendix 
 
Optimization in a private school: 
 
Private schools profits maximization:   
[ ] FkVdbdyybfybybpMAX jr
s
jrijrjr −−= ∫∫ )(),(),(),( αpi  
Subject to: 
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∫∫=
s
jrjr dbdyybfybk ),(),(α         (1c) 
∫∫=
s
jr
jr
jr dbdyybfybbk ),(),(
1
αθ        (1d) 
( ) dbdyybfybb
k jr
sjr
jr ),(),(
1 22 αθσ ∫∫ −=       (1e) 
The three constraints can be integrated in two: 
∫∫ ∫∫ =−
s s
jrjrjr dbddyybfybbdbdyybfyb 0),(),(),(),( ααθ  
( )∫∫ ∫∫ =−−
s s
jrjrjrjr dbdyybfybdbdyybfybb 0),(),(),(),( 22 ασαθ  
The Lagrangian function is of the following form: 
[ ]
( ) 





−−
′
−






−−−−=Φ
∫∫ ∫∫
∫∫∫∫∫∫
s s
jrjrjrjr
s
jr
s
jrjrjrjr
s
jrijr
dbdyybfybdbdyybfybb
dbdyybfybbdbdyybfybFkVdbdyybfybybp
),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),()(),(),(),(
22 ασαθµ
ααθµα
With jrµ and jrµ ′ are the Lagrangian multipliers. 
Optimization is made through the partial derivation of the Lagrangian function over 
),( ybjrα , results are the following: 
( )[ ] 0)()(),( 22* =−−′−−−′−=∂ Φ∂ jrjrjrjrjrjrijr bbkVpyb σθµθµα  
])[()()( 22* jrjrjrjrjrjrijr bbkVp σθµθµ −−′+−+′=  
 
Proof of proposition 1: 
The public sector is chosen when: 
( )ijujuiiu bNYytWW ,,,,,, 2σθ=  ≥  ( )ijrjriir bytWW ,,,, 2σθ=  
The couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  must satisfy the following equation: 
),,,,(),,,,,,( 22 ijrjriirijujuiiu bytWbNYytW σθσθ =  
It should be noted that private school quality is always superior to that of public schools. 
This is consistent with the reality; if public schools have better qualities than private 
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schools, rational individuals will choose free public schools and the private sector will 
not exist. A private school with a quality lower than that of a public school will be 
eliminated from the market by the simple functioning of competition. Thus we can write: 
jrju qq <  
In order to demonstrate the existence of ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  we analyze two extreme cases.  
 
First case:   
  
For very low income levels, individuals can not pay tuition for the private school with the 
lowest quality. For very low abilities, individuals can not benefit from a financial aide or 
a tuition discount; we have 0* >ijrp  and
**)1( ijriri pcyt <−−  for this school; which means 
that the price for the lowest quality private school exceeds the disposable income. 
 
These individuals can not pay the price in the private sector, and no private school 
accepts to admit them. Thus they are obliged to choose the public sector iuir WW <= 0
*
. 
 
Second Case: 
 
For very high incomes, individuals can pay private school tuition. For very high abilities, 
individuals can obtain financial aide (scholarship) in a certain private school. We 
have 0* >ijrp and small (or 0* <ijrp ). As a consequence we have 
 
*** )1()1( ijriiriui pytccyt −−=>=−  but the difference is small. 
Or ( *** )1()1( ijriiriui pytccyt −−=≤=− ) 
0)1( ** >−−= ijriir pytc since income is high.  
Since 0),(lim =
∞→
qc
c
. Individuals always prefer increased quality even if consumption in 
the private sector is weakly reduced. iuir WW > . Individuals choose the private sector.  
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We have seen that for low levels of income and ability, the public sector is preferred; 
conversely for high levels of income and ability the private sector is preferred. The 
continuity of f(b,y) implies that when ability and income levels increase (going from one 
extreme to the other) it is clear that there exists a point for which preferences will be 
reversed. This equilibrium is determined by a couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  for which individuals are 
indifferent between the two sectors. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
(i) and (ii) are the outcome of proposition 1. ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is the indifference point between the 
two sectors. For individuals with yyi ˆ<  and bbi ˆ< the public sector is preferred. For 
individuals with yyi ˆ>  and bbi ˆ>  the private sector is preferred.  
 
For (iii) and (iiii): 
For sufficiently high ability bbi ˆ> and low income yyi ˆ< . And for sufficiently high 
income yyi ˆ> and low ability bbi ˆ< .  
We have two cases: for the first 0* >ijrp  and for the second 0
* <ijrp . 
For the first case: *** )1()1( ijriiriui pytccyt −−=>=− . 
A necessary condition for admission in the private sector will be: 
0)1( ** >−−= ijriir pytc in other terms )1(
*
t
p
y ijri
−
≥ . 
0),(lim =
∞→
qc
c
implies that this student prefers higher school quality over higher 
consumption, thus he chooses the private sector. iuir WW > . 
 
For the second case: *** )1()1( ijriiriui pytccyt −−=≤=−  
The student is admitted in the private sector without any condition. iuir WW >  since 
school quality and consumption are higher is the private sector. 
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Proof of Lemma 2: 
(i) For ( )PN ,0∈ , the couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is decreasing in N. An increase of N represents a 
congestion effect of public schools; thus public expenditure per pupil 
N
tY
 decreases. As a 
consequence public school quality decreases. Students on the margin between sectors will 
opt out of the public sector to join the private one. In this case ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  decreases.  
 
(ii) For +ℜ∈Y , the couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is increasing in Y. An increase of Y implies a growth of 
public school quality following a growth of public expenditure per pupil
N
tY
. Students on 
the margin between sectors will opt out of the private sector to join the public one. In this 
case ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  increases. 
 
(iii) For [ ]1,0∈t , the couple ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  is increasing in t. On one hand, an increase of t implies 
a decrease of consumption in both sectors, thus the effect of t on consumption as a factor 
of individual utility is neutral. On the other hand an increase of t induces a growth of 
public expenditure per pupil. As a consequence public school quality increases. Students 
on the margin between sectors will opt out of the private sector to join the public one. In 
this case ( )yb ˆ,ˆ  increases. 
 
Proof of proposition 2: 
In Lemma 2 we have presented the fact that public school quality is decreasing in N. 
Conversely, private school quality is not dependent on N16. Indifference is given by : 
],)1[(],)1[( *** jrijriirjuiiu qpytUqytU −−=−  
The left hand side of the equation is decreasing in N; while the right hand side of the 
equation is independent of N. For N very low, public school quality is very high. For N 
very high, public school quality is very low. 
                                                 
16
 Each school chooses its size according to its profit maximization problem. 
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While passing from one extreme to the other. The intersection between the decreasing 
and the steady function determines the unique equilibrium number of students N*. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
We consider two individuals, the first has a couple ),( 11 yb and the second has a 
couple ),( 22 yb . We consider that ),( 11 yb > ),( 22 yb > )ˆ,ˆ( yb . 
We suppose that ),(ˆ),(ˆ 222111 ybtybt <  
 
For the individual with ),( 11 yb , we have: 
],,,),,(ˆ[],,,,,),,(ˆ[ 12111111211111 byybtWbNYyybtW jrjrrjujuu σθσθ =    (a) 
 
For the individual with ),( 22 yb , we have:  
],,,),,(ˆ[],,,,,),,(ˆ[ 22222222222222 byybtWbNYyybtW jrjrrjujuu σθσθ =  
According to figure 1 and the explanation of individual behavior, for each ),(ˆ 222 ybtt < , 
we have:  
],,,,[],,,,,,[ 22222222 bytWbNYytW jrjrrjujuu σθσθ <  
As we have ),(ˆ),(ˆ 222111 ybtybt < , we can write: 
],,,),,(ˆ[],,,,,),,(ˆ[ 22211122221112 byybtWbNYyybtW jrjrrjujuu σθσθ <    (b) 
As we have ),( 11 yb > ),( 22 yb , we can write: 
],,,),,(ˆ[],,,),,(ˆ[ 12111112221112 byybtWbyybtW jrjrrjrjrr σθσθ <     (c) 
From (a), (b), and (c) we can write: 
],,,,,),,(ˆ[],,,,,),,(ˆ[ 12111112221112 bNYyybtWbNYyybtW jujuujujuu σθσθ <   (d) 
 
From assumption 1 and 2 we have for ),( 11 yb > ),( 22 yb  with ),( 11 yb > ),( 22 yb > )ˆ,ˆ( yb : 
],,,,,),,(ˆ[],,,,,),,(ˆ[ 12111112221112 bNYyybtWbNYyybtW jujuujujuu σθσθ > . This is a 
contradiction with (d). 
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In this case, our supposition that ),(ˆ),(ˆ 222111 ybtybt <  is wrong. This implies that the 
reverse is true ),(ˆ),(ˆ 222111 ybtybt > . As a consequence the indifference tax rate ),(ˆ iii ybt is 
increasing in the couple ),( ii yb over ( bˆ , maxb ) x ( yˆ , maxy ).  
The case where ),( 11 yb < )ˆ,ˆ( yb or ),( 22 yb < )ˆ,ˆ( yb , does not have any influence, 
individuals are enrolled in the public sector and 0=rW .  
 
Proof of Lemma 4: For ∈t ]1),,([ mmmu ybt => t > ),( mmmu ybt . 
We consider an individual 1, he has ),( 11 yb > ),( mm yb . 
The first condition of the existence of a majority voting equilibrium determined by the 
individual with the median couple of income and ability implies: 
),( 11 yb > ),( mm yb => ),( mmmu ybt > ),( 111 ybt u . We have two situations to analyze:  
  
1- For an individual with ),( 11 yb , we suppose that ),(ˆ 111 ybt < ),( 111 ybt u  
From figure 1, this individual will be in the public sector for ∈t ]1),,([ mmmu ybt . We can 
write: ),(ˆ 111 ybt < ),( 111 ybt u < ),( mmmu ybt < ∈t ]1),,([ mmmu ybt  
As public sector’s utility is decreasing in t over the interval ]1),,([ 111 ybt u and thus 
over ]1),,([ mmmu ybt  . The individual will prefer ),( mmmu ybt to any other tax rate 
>t ]1),,([ mmmu ybt since ]1),,([ mmmu ybt is the lowest tax rate. 
In this case, we have: ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmuu σθ > ],,,,,,[ 1211 bNYytW jujuu σθ  
 
2- For an individual with ),( 11 yb  we suppose that ),(ˆ 111 ybt > ),( 111 ybt u . 
From figure 1, this individual will be in the private sector. 
As private sector’s utility is decreasing in t. The individual will prefer the lowest tax rate 
over the interval, thus he chooses ),( mmmu ybt . 
In this case, we have: ],,,),,([ 1211 byybtW jrjrmmmur σθ < ],,,,[ 1211 bytW jrjrr σθ  
Over the interval ]1),,([ mmmu ybt , there does not exist a tax rate different from 
),( mmmu ybt which represents a majority voting equilibrium.  
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Proof of Lemma 5: For ∈t )],(),,(ˆ[ mmmummm ybtybt , we consider an individual, he has 
),( 11 yb < ),( mm yb . 
∈t )],(),,(ˆ[ mmmummm ybtybt => ),( mmmu ybtt <  
As public sector’s utility is increasing in t over this interval. The individual will choose 
the highest tax rate over this interval, thus he chooses ),( mmmu ybt . 
In this case, we have: ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmuu σθ > ],,,,,,[ 1211 bNYytW jujuu σθ  
Over the interval )],(),,(ˆ[ mmmummm ybtybt , there does not exist a tax rate different from 
),( mmmu ybt which represents a majority voting equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
(i) For ),( 11 yb < ),( mm yb we can write: 
],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmmu bNYyybtW σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ  
With )ˆ,ˆ( yb < ),( 11 yb < ),( mm yb . (See assumption 1 and 2). 
If ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmumu bNYyybtW σθ is true.  
And since ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ  with ),( 11 yb < ),( mm yb . 
We can write: 
],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmumu bNYyybtW σθ  
< ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ  
Thus: ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ . 
 
(ii) For ),( 11 yb > ),( mm yb we can write: 
],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmmu bNYyybtW σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ  
With )ˆ,ˆ( yb < ),( mm yb < ),( 11 yb .(See assumption 1 and 2). 
If ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmumu bNYyybtW σθ is true. 
And since ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ > ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ  as ),( 11 yb > ),( mm yb . 
We can write: 
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],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ > ],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmumu bNYyybtW σθ  
> ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ  
Thus: ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ > ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ . 
The case where )ˆ,ˆ( yb > ),( 11 yb and )ˆ,ˆ( yb > ),( mm yb , has no influence since individual 1 
and individual m have no choice between the two sectors. They are obliged to enroll in 
public schools. 
 
Proof of proposition 3:  
In this proposition, we have to demonstrate that over the interval )],(ˆ,0[ mmm ybt , there 
does not exist a tax rate which is preferred to ),( mmmu ybt by more than 50% of the 
population. For an individual with ),( 11 yb < ),( mm yb we have two situations to analyze. 
The interval is divided into two )],(ˆ,0[ 111 ybt and )],(ˆ),,(ˆ[ 111 mmm ybtybt . 
 
1- For ∈t )],(ˆ,0[ 111 ybt => t< ),( mmmu ybt .  
],,,,[ 1211 bytW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ . (As rW1 is decreasing in t). 
And since ],,,,0[ 1211 byW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ .  
(From the first part of Lemma 6 with:  
],,,,0[ 2 mjrjrmmr byW σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 2 mjujummmmmumu bNYyybtW σθ true). 
We can write: ],,,,[ 1211 bytW jrjrr σθ < ],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW jujummmmu σθ   
Thus the tax rate ),( mmmu ybt is preferred to any other tax rate over the 
interval )],(ˆ,0[ 111 ybt . 
 
2- For ∈t )],(ˆ),,(ˆ[ 111 mmm ybtybt => t< ),( mmmu ybt . 
Over this interval, public sector’s utility is increasing in t. The individual chooses the 
highest tax rate ),( mmmu ybt .  
],,,,,),,([ 1211 bNYyybtW ujjummmmuu σθ > ],,,,,,[ 1211 bNYytW jujumu σθ  
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In conclusion we find that over the three intervals )],(ˆ,0[ mmm ybt , 
)],(),,(ˆ[ mmmummm ybtybt  and ]1),,([ mmmu ybt . There does not exist any tax rate that is 
preferred to ),( mmmu ybt by more than 50% of the population. Thus the couple ),( mm Nt  is 
a majority voting equilibrium.  
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